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I. Introduction 
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson called on Congress to 
enact new legislation to combat organized crime and 
racketeering—a “national industry” which had become a “cancer in 
the city.”1 In 1970, Congress responded to the President’s call to 
action.2 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) provided prosecutors with powerful new tools to deal with 
organized crime and the Mafia.3 Through RICO, Congress created 
new criminal penalties and civil actions against individuals 
engaging in certain criminal activities related to an enterprise.4 
Although the legislation was initially designed to prevent the 
infiltration of legitimate businesses,5 the Supreme Court 
eventually ruled that RICO also prohibited the operation of 
organizations solely engaged in criminal conduct.6 Today, the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 111 CONG. REC. S4277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1965) (message from President 
Johnson). 
 2. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 
922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2018)) (“It is the purpose of this 
Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by 
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process . . . to deal with 
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.”); Nixon Signs Bill to 
Combat Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 1970), https://perma.cc/H7PY-44N3 (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“The new law, Mr. Nixon said, will give the Federal 
Government the means ‘to launch a total war against organized crime, and we 
will end this war.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 3. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961–1968 (2018) (prohibiting infiltration of an enterprise with funds obtained 
through racketeering activities and engaging in racketeering activities through 
an enterprise). 
 4. See id. §§ 1963–1964 (providing penalties and remedies including 
imprisonment of twenty years to life, forfeiture of assets, and triple damages). 
 5. See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76–77 (1969) (outlining how racketeers 
infiltrate business ranging from bowling alleys to stock exchanges).  
 6. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1981) (“On its face, 
the definition [of enterprise] appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate 
enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes criminal enterprises than it does 
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statute addresses two primary concerns: (1) the infiltration or 
control of an enterprise by criminals and (2) the operation of an 
enterprise for a criminal purpose.7 In his seminal article RICO: 
The Crime of Being a Criminal, Columbia Law professor and 
Senior Circuit Court Judge Gerald Lynch referred to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(a) and (b) as the “infiltration” subsections designed to 
prevent criminals from infiltrating legitimate businesses and 
characterized § 1962(c) as the “criminally operated” enterprise 
subsection which concerned participation in an enterprise through 
criminal activities.8 
Since the law’s passage, “infiltration” cases have fallen to the 
wayside,9 with “operation” cases being the primary vehicle for the 
statute’s use.10 In 1987, Judge Lynch asserted that the infiltration 
subsections were essentially “dead letters as prosecuting tools.”11 
Instead, prosecutors have primarily used the “operation” 
subsection to go after mob bosses, Ponzi-schemers and gang 
members,12 and their focus has expanded beyond mobsters to 
                                                                                                                 
legitimate ones.”). 
 7. H. LOWELL BROWN & WES R. PORTER, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: RICO § 1:4 
(2019) (“Liability under RICO arises from either: (1) investing or acquiring an 
interest in; or (2) controlling; or (3) conducting the affairs of an enterprise through 
a pattern of racketeering activity.”). 
 8.  See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & 
II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 731–32 (1987) (categorizing different types of 
prosecutions brought under § 1962). 
 9.  See DAVID B. SMITH & TERRANCE G. REED, CIVIL RICO § 5.02 (2019) 
(“[S]ection 1962(a) attracted little notice from prosecutors.”). 
 10. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 726–31 (providing an overview of RICO 
prosecutions since the statute’s enactment and discussing the decrease in use of 
the infiltration subsections); see also SMITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 5.02 n.4 
(“In fact there does not seem to be a single case in which a real organized crime 
figure has been prosecuted under § 1962(a).”).  
 11. Lynch, supra note 8, at 726. 
 12. See id. at 726–27 (“Of the 236 RICO indictments included in the study, 
only 17 (fewer than eight percent) appear to have included counts charging 
violations of [the infiltration] sections, or conspiracies to violate them.”); Nathan 
Koppel, They Call It RICO, and It Is Sweeping, WALL ST. J., 
https://perma.cc/MC8G-RR3P (last updated Jan. 20, 2011, 5:14 PM) (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2019) (“Prosecutors have used RICO to pursue some of the highest-profile 
organized-crime families, including the Gambinos and Genoveses . . . .”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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sometimes include corporate executives.13 Civil litigants have 
turned RICO into a tool to take business disputes to federal court 
with hopes of earning triple damages out of arguably lesser cases.14  
The expansive use of RICO is subject to criticism, with some 
scholars arguing that prosecutors and litigants have stretched the 
act’s language too far.15 In response to early criticism, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) established guidelines regarding the 
use of RICO16 and Congress limited its applicability in the civil 
context.17 
Now almost fifty years after RICO’s passage, criminals are 
turning to the internet and cryptocurrencies to establish a new 
frontier for organized crime.18 RICO’s application to 
cryptocurrencies is the subject of this Note. Cryptocurrencies are 
digital money—virtual assets intended to serve as an alternative 
to traditional money using a decentralized system and 
cryptography to track transactions and prevent fraud.19 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Peter J. Henning, RICO Charge in Pharmaceutical Case May Signal 
Tougher Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/H3N4-KV2R (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (detailing RICO charges against pharmaceutical executives 
allegedly employing a kickback scheme with doctors) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 14. See Peter J. Henning, RICO Lawsuits Are Tempting, but Tread Lightly, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/ZP4P-KBCJ (last visited Nov. 5, 
2019) (“RICO lawsuits are tempting. They allow a plaintiff to sue . . . and seek an 
award of triple damages, a bonanza in some business disputes that can run into 
millions of dollars.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15.  See Lynch, supra note 8, at 726–63 (discussing federal prosecutors’ 
expansive use of RICO); Craig M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: 
An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837, 838 (1980) (suggesting that RICO is 
overly broad and courts should engage in a narrow judicial construction of the 
statute).  
 16. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-110.200 (“[I]t is the policy 
of the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively and uniformly used.”). 
 17. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67 
§ 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2018)) (amending 
RICO to prevent civil actions for securities fraud under RICO unless the 
individual is first criminally convicted of the fraud). 
 18. See, e.g., YAYA J. FANUSIE & TOM ROBINSON, FOUND. FOR DEF. OF 
DEMOCRACIES, CTR. ON SANCTIONS & ILLICIT FIN., BITCOIN LAUNDERING: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ILLICIT FLOWS INTO DIGITAL CURRENCY SERVICES (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/3SF5-JKWB (PDF) (“Criminals—often early adopters of new 
technologies—quickly appreciated that Bitcoin has unique properties that could 
potentially serve their interest in evading law enforcement.”). 
 19. See Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 3, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/4XZP-JJZU (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“A cryptocurrency is a 
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Cryptocurrencies and the underlying blockchain technology serve 
plenty of legitimate uses including online shopping and 
instantaneous peer-to-peer payments.20 Despite these legitimate 
uses, cryptocurrencies have acquired an illicit reputation due to 
their use by criminals.21  
Champions of cryptocurrencies often tout them as an 
anonymous way to transfer funds free from oversight.22 This 
promise of anonymity caused criminals to flock to 
cryptocurrency.23 However, cryptocurrencies’ anonymous nature is 
often overstated, with the truth being that cryptocurrencies are 
generally pseudo-anonymous, obscuring personal information but 
still allowing tracing of transactions and identification of users by 
law enforcement officers.24 Nevertheless, criminals continue to use 
cryptocurrencies to mask their identities in modern digital twists 
                                                                                                                 
digital or virtual currency that is secured by cryptography, which makes it nearly 
impossible to counterfeit or double-spend.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 20. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS FIN. SERVS. INST., MONEY IS NO OBJECT: 
UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLVING CRYPTOCURRENCY MARKET 8 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/LP6J-ZRBR (PDF) (surveying consumers’ cryptocurrency usage). 
 21. See id. at 1 (“[N]ot all media coverage surrounding cryptocurrency has 
been positive, with several high profile situations noting Bitcoin’s use in a variety 
of illicit contexts.”).  
 22. See FERGAL REID & MARTIN HARRIGAN, AN ANALYSIS OF ANONYMITY IN THE 
BITCOIN SYSTEM 2 (2012), https://perma.cc/9GZJ-EEK4 (PDF) (discussing 
Wikileaks’ solicitation of “anonymous” bitcoin donations). 
 23. See Corinne Ramey, The Crypto Crime Wave Is Here, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
26, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://perma.cc/R8QG-PKPA (“From stickups and drug 
deals to white-collar scams, cryptocurrency-related crime is soaring—and law 
enforcement is scrambling to keep up.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 24.  See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 20, at 8 (“[A cryptocurrency] 
transaction can be traced to the person/entity (if illegal activity is suspected) 
using a combination of procedures that includes identifying the destination of the 
transaction through the publically available transaction ledger.”). 
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on classic organized crimes, including money laundering,25 drug 
sales,26 and extortion.27  
In an early and infamous example of cryptocurrency crime, 
Ross Ulbricht launched an illicit online drug marketplace known 
as Silk Road that facilitated 1.2 million Bitcoin transactions worth 
approximately $1.2 billion dollars.28 More recently, hackers used 
malware to seize control of hospital computers and required a 
ransom in bitcoins before unlocking the computers.29 In late 2018, 
kidnappers abducted Anne-Elisabeth Falkevik Hagen, wife of a 
Norwegian utilities and real estate magnate, and left a note 
requiring a nine million euros ransom be paid in cryptocurrency.30 
Many of these crypto-crimes constitute predicate acts under 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Exchange Was Nexus of Crime, Indictment 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/YP2A-GG9X (last visited Nov. 
5, 2019) (detailing the arrest of Alexander Vinnik, who ran a Bitcoin exchange 
that facilitated ransomware fraud, identity theft, drug trafficking, and public 
corruption) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 26. See Nathaniel Popper & Rebecca R. Ruiz, 2 Leading Online Black 
Markets Are Shut Down by Authorities, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/G62U-URKK (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting on the closure 
of AlphaBay and Hansa Market, two large dark-net black markets which relied 
on cryptocurrency) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 27. See Mark Scott & Nicole Perlroth, With Ransomware, It’s Pay and 
Embolden Perpetrators, or Lose Precious Data, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/J4G3-KUAZ (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (outlining ransomware 
attacks that affected more than two hundred thousand computers) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Thieves 
Threaten Real Violence for Virtual Currencies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/H6UR-TLNG (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting on bitcoin 
owners forced to make an irreversible transfer to thieves through robbery and 
extortion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. See Nate Anderson & Cyrus Farivar, How The Feds Took Down the 
Dread Pirate Roberts, ARS TECHNICA (October 3, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/38KR-S6CU (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (detailing the operation of 
a drug trafficking online marketplace which relied on Bitcoin for its payment 
system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. See Samuel Gibbs, Wannacry: Hackers Withdraw £108,000 of Bitcoin 
Ransom, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2017, 9:27 AM), https://perma.cc/Q3AC-K58X (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting on the withdrawal of the successful ransom 
payments) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 30. See Henrik Pryser Libell & Richard Martyn-Hemphill, Cryptocurrency 
Ransom Demanded for Wife of Norwegian Tycoon, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/MP7W-DXPA (“[T]he police had advised Ms. Hagen’s husband, 
Tom Hagen, not to pay.”). 
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RICO,31 enabling federal prosecutors and civil litigants to use 
RICO if the crimes were undertaken as part of an enterprise or if 
the perpetrator used the predicate crimes to infiltrate an 
enterprise.32 
At least two cases, one criminal and one civil, have attempted 
prosecution of cryptocurrency criminals under RICO. In 2017, a 
grand jury indicted Alexandre Cazes under RICO for his 
leadership of a criminal enterprise overseeing a massive illegal 
online marketplace, ten times larger than Silk Road.33 However, 
the prosecution ended after Cazes committed suicide.34 In late 
2018, Michael Terpin, a cryptocurrency investor, used RICO to sue 
a hacker for illegally accessing his phone account and subsequently 
stealing over twenty-three million dollars in cryptocurrency.35 
Both of these cases used the operation subsection of the statute. 
This Note argues that one of the infiltration subsections of 
RICO may be better suited to cryptocurrency prosecutions.36 
Subsection 1962(a) addresses the infiltration of an enterprise by 
investing proceeds from racketeering activities and this Note 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2018) (defining “racketeering activity” with an 
extensive list of state and federal crimes).   
 32. See id. § 1962 (providing that it is unlawful to: (a) invest income from 
racketeering activities into an enterprise, (b) acquire or maintain an interest in 
any enterprise through racketeering activities, (c) use racketeering activities 
during the business of any enterprise, and (d) conspire to violate the substantive 
provisions of RICO). 
 33.  See Indictment at ¶¶ 21–23, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 
1:17-CR-00144 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) (charging Cazes for his part in operating 
AlphaBay, an enterprise engaged in racketeering activities); see also Thomas 
Brewster, Forget Silk Road, Cops Just Scored Their Biggest Victory Against The 
Dark Web Drug Trade, FORBES (July 20, 2017, 10:57 AM), 
https://perma.cc/SRY9-ANRT (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“[A]s many as $2 million 
in trades were being done over AlphaBay every week as of April [2017].”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 34 . See Wassayos Ngamkham, Canadian Drug Suspect Found Hanged in 
Cell, BANGKOK POST (July 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/AAV5-PCDU (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting that Cazes committed suicide while in Thai custody 
awaiting extradition to the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 35. See Complaint at ¶¶ 33–45, Terpin v. Truglia, Case No. 18-ST-CV-09875 
(Super. Ct. Cal. Dec. 28, 2018) (detailing an enterprise consisting of Truglia and 
twenty-five unknown individuals).  
 36. See infra Part IV (regarding the uses of cryptocurrency networks as the 
enterprise required by the statute). 
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contends that a cryptocurrency network could serve as the 
“enterprise” required by the statute.37 Instead of having to 
investigate and prove the relationships in an underlying criminal 
enterprise, proponents of a RICO case against crypto-criminals 
could rely on well-documented and publicly available information 
about the cryptocurrency network to prove the enterprise and the 
relationships among its members.38 If accepted by courts, 
prosecutors and plaintiffs could proceed under investing 
subsection with assurances that the “enterprise” element of the 
statute would be satisfied.39 In addition to punishing criminals, 
this proposed method would also benefit legitimate cryptocurrency 
users by discouraging criminals from infiltrating legitimate 
cryptocurrency businesses.40  
In order to provide some background, this Note will first 
summarize the history of cryptocurrencies and RICO.41 Next, this 
Note will explore the elements of a RICO claim and the current 
methods of prosecuting cryptocurrency criminals.42 The discussion 
will turn to how cryptocurrency networks could be used to satisfy 
the enterprise element of the RICO statute.43 This Note will then 
examine some potential criticisms of cryptocurrencies as a RICO 
enterprise.44 The discussion will conclude with some thoughts 
regarding the prudence of cryptocurrency prosecutions under 
RICO and what type of cryptocurrency cases should be prosecuted 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(b) (2018) (prohibiting investment of 
racketeering proceeds in an enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“‘[E]nterprise’ 
includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal 
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a 
legal entity . . . .”). 
 38. See, e.g., Blockchain Explorer, BLOCKCHAIN LUXEMBOURG S.A., 
https://perma.cc/6RN9-L5WB (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (cataloging every Bitcoin 
transaction in existence and the relationships between Bitcoin users) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 39. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) (concluding that 
RICO prohibits both the infiltration of legitimate business and enterprises 
created for solely criminal purposes). 
 40. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (regarding the investment or interest in an 
enterprise through racketeering activities).  
 41. See infra Part II. 
 42. See infra Part III. 
 43. See infra Part IV.A. 
 44. See infra Part IV.B. 
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under RICO.45 In essence, this Note argues that prosecutors should 
be able to demonstrate that a criminal using cryptocurrencies has 
infiltrated an enterprise in violation of RICO, but should exercise 
restraint unless the criminal is engaging in criminal activities on 
the scale of traditional organized crime.46 
I. Summary of RICO and Cryptocurrencies  
A. The History of RICO 
Concerned with the mob’s wide-spread criminal activities,47 
Congress drafted RICO to protect the public from the scourge of 
organized crime.48 To that end, the legislature imbued on 
prosecutors a “general tool to bring any prosecution that the 
Justice Department thinks is desirable but that does not fit under 
any other heading.”49 The use of RICO as a “general tool” depends 
on two statutory sources: the expansive definition of enterprise50 
and the wide range of criminal activities covered by the statute.51 
In order to provide the broad powers required to prosecute 
organized crime, the bill evolved beyond Congress’s initial purpose 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See infra Part V (concluding that the success of a cryptocurrency 
prosecution under the proposed method will likely depend on how much the 
underlying situation reflects the original intention of Congress). 
 46. See infra Part IV (analyzing the enterprise requirement and the 
Department of Justice guidelines regarding the use of RICO). 
 47. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 681–82 (discussing Senator McClellan’s 
introduction of the bill and its subsequent revisions). 
 48. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 
922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2018)) (“It is the purpose of this 
Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by 
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process . . . to deal with 
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.”). 
 49. Lynch, supra note 8, at 724. 
 50. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2018) (defining enterprise as “any individual, 
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or 
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity”); see also Lynch, 
supra note 8, at 732 (discussing the requirement that an “enterprise” be a legal 
association or association in fact). 
 51.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (listing the predicate acts eligible for RICO 
prosecution). 
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to prevent infiltration of legitimate organizations to include all 
manners of criminal activities connected with an enterprise.52 
Some courts initially attempted to limit RICO’s broad 
application.53 However, the Supreme Court soon considered and 
rejected these limitations on the definition of enterprise. 
In United States v. Turkette,54 the Court reviewed a RICO 
prosecution of Novia Turkette, Jr. for his alleged leadership of a 
criminal organization with no apparent legitimate purpose.55 
Turkette argued—and the Court of Appeals agreed—that RICO 
exclusively applied to the infiltration of legitimate enterprises and 
excluded criminal organizations that performed only illegal acts.56 
The Court dismissed the argument.57 
The Court considered two potential purposes of RICO and 
§ 1962(c): to prevent infiltration of legitimate businesses by 
criminal elements58 and to allow prosecution of any criminals 
engaging in an enterprise.59 The Court first reviewed the 
unambiguous language of the statute, observing that the statute 
itself made no mention of legitimate or criminal concerns in 
defining “enterprise.”60 The Court then rejected the lower court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 713 (“If RICO has evolved into something 
different from what Congress intended at its creation, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that Congress has looked at what has evolved, and pronounced it 
good.”). 
 53. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899 (1st Cir. 1980) (“A 
careful reading of sections 1961(4) and 1962(c) convinces us that they cannot be 
used as tandem springboards to reach any individual or groups of individuals who 
engage in a pattern of exclusively criminal racketeering activity.”). 
 54. See 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981) (providing that RICO covers both 
infiltration of legitimate business and entirely criminal enterprises). 
 55. See id. at 579 (summarizing the RICO conspiracy charge against 
Turkette for leading a criminal organization which trafficked narcotics, 
committed arsons, defrauded insurance companies, bribed police, and corruptly 
influenced state court proceedings). 
 56. See id. (noting that the Court of Appeals agreed with Turkette’s 
characterization of the statute).  
 57. See id. (reversing the Court of Appeals decision). 
 58. See id. at 591 (“[T]he legislative history forcefully supports the view that 
the major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legitimate business 
by organized crime.”). 
 59. See id. at 581 (“Congress did nothing to indicate that an enterprise 
consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the 
enterprise was exclusively criminal.”). 
 60. See id. at 580–81 (“On its face, the definition appears to include both 
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conclusion that a broad definition created internal inconsistencies 
in the statute.61 Confident that the language of the statute 
supported the broad definition, the Court examined the legislative 
history to support its conclusion.62 Congress’s declared purpose to 
combat organized crime rendered the narrow definition untenable 
because “[w]hole areas of organized criminal activity would be 
placed beyond the substantive reach of the enactment . . . so long 
as the association did not deviate from the criminal path.”63  
After Turkette, prosecutors—primarily limited by 
prosecutorial discretion—used RICO’s newly broadened powers to 
prosecute criminals engaging in enterprises.64 With the broad 
definition of enterprise, prosecutorial discretion under RICO goes 
far beyond typical discretion and authorizes prosecutors to add on 
a major federal criminal charge to comparatively minor predicate 
crimes.65 Criminal RICO prosecutions soon expanded from 
traditional organized crime to include white collar crime.66 
                                                                                                                 
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes 
criminal enterprises than it does legitimate ones.”). 
 61.  See id. at 587 (“Applying [RICO] also to criminal organizations does not 
render any portion of the statute superfluous nor does it create any structural 
incongruities within the framework of the Act.”). 
 62. See id. (“We are also quite sure that nothing in the legislative history of 
RICO requires a contrary conclusion.”). 
 63. Id. at 589–90. 
 64. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & 
IV, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 921 (1987) (arguing that after Turkette, prosecutors 
invoked RICO in cases resembling simple conspiracy); John Dombrink & James 
W. Meeker, Racketeering Prosecution: The Use and Abuse of RICO, 16 RUTGERS 
L.J. 633, 640–54 (1985) (concluding that criminal RICO was used in a 
conservative manner during its first fourteen years); Jeff Atkinson, Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68: Broadest of the 
Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1978) (“[Under RICO, 
t]he only limits of federal domination of enforcement of these traditionally 
state-prosecuted crimes are the limits of federal resources and prosecutorial 
discretion.”). 
 65. See Russell D. Leblang, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion Under State 
RICO, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 79, 88 (1990) (“The fact that the crime defined by 
RICO is so far reaching, and that the disparity of scale between the sanctions 
available under RICO and those under the predicates is so great, ‘suggests [that] 
the prosecutor’s ability to unilaterally declare a crime major or minor has 
dramatically increased.’”). 
 66. See G. Robert Blakey & John Robert Blakey, Civil and Criminal RICO: 
An Overview of the Statute and Its Operation, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 36, 43 (1997) 
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Without the difficulty of proving a legitimate enterprise, 
prosecutors generally abandoned § 1962(a)’s prohibition of 
investment of racketeering income and § 1962(b)’s proscription 
against acquisition of control over an enterprise through a pattern 
of racketeering activity.67 Some commentators have argued that 
the broad definition of “enterprise” grants prosecutors “unfettered 
freedom to allege the ‘enterprise’ best suited to its needs in a 
particular case.”68 To address concerns about abuses, the DOJ 
adopted strict guidelines regarding the use of RICO,69 and the 
worries about potential abuses have generally not come to 
fruition.70 Despite continuing criticisms, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its expansive interpretation of the enterprise element 
in Boyle v. United States.71 Boyle and Turkette are the two primary 
cases regarding the enterprise element,72 but the statute has 
several other nuances worth exploring before discussing how the 
statute might apply to a cryptocurrency network. 
                                                                                                                 
(“Roughly 39 percent have been in the organized crime area . . . , while 48 percent 
have been in the white-collar crime area . . . [, and 13] percent fall into other 
categories, such as violent groups, including terrorists, white-hate, and 
anti-Semitic.”); see also Lucian E. Dervan & Ellen S. Podgor, “White-Collar 
Crime”: Still Hazy After All These Years, 50 GA. L. REV. 709, 759–60 (2016) 
(“Despite RICO’s initial focus on these traditional mafia organizations, only about 
4% of the RICO cases decided by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits from 2002 to 
2014 involved what might be considered traditional organized crime entities.”). 
 67. See Daniel Murner et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1619, 1639–40 (2018) (“Relatively few 
criminal indictments allege a violation of § 1962(a) . . . . Like § 1962(a), § 1962(b) 
rarely forms the basis of a RICO action.” (citations omitted)). 
 68. SMITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 3.05. 
 69.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-110.200 (“Despite the 
broad statutory language of RICO and the legislative intent that the 
statute ‘. . . shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose,’ it is 
the policy of the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively and uniformly used.”). 
 70.  See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 
879, 915 (2005) (“Although faith in prosecutorial discretion has arguably been 
vindicated by extreme restraint in the use of criminal RICO, the course of action 
pursued in Turkette was, to say the least, dangerous.”). 
 71. 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009) (“As we succinctly put it in Turkette, an 
association-in-fact enterprise is ‘a group of persons associated together for a 
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.’” (quoting United States v. 
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981))). 
 72. See SMITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 3.02 (stating that Turkette resolved 
the paramount issue of whether RICO encompassed illegitimate enterprises and 
Boyle set the bounds of what constitutes an enterprise). 
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B. The Elements of a RICO Case 
RICO punishes a “person” for engaging in a “pattern of 
racketeering activities” connected to an “enterprise” which affects 
interstate or foreign commerce.73 The “person,” the “pattern of 
racketeering activities,” and the “enterprise” are typically the 
litigated elements of a violation.74 Congress intended for the law to 
be liberally construed,75 which influences courts towards broader 
interpretations of the statute.76 
The RICO “person” is the least litigated aspect of the statute.77 
The statutory definition is not limited to natural persons but 
rather includes “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal 
or beneficial interest in property.”78 Courts have interpreted this 
broad definition to include corporations,79 unincorporated political 
committees,80 and decedents’ estates.81 In interpreting the RICO 
person, courts examine state law to see if the alleged person is 
capable of holding property.82 Unsurprisingly, courts typically 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2018) (providing three ways to violate the statute 
as well as a conspiracy charge). 
 74. See Blakey & Blakey, supra note 66, at 38 (summarizing the essential 
elements of the statute). 
 75. See SMITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 3.01 (asserting that the Supreme 
Court cut the heart out of the statute in Turkette, and then failed to rectify its 
mistake in Boyle). 
 76. See generally Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of 
Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1103–21 (1982) (cataloging judicial 
restrictions on RICO).  
 77.  See Blakey & Blakey, supra note 66, at 38 (“The two basic elements of 
RICO that have given litigants the most trouble are ‘pattern’ and ‘enterprise.’”). 
 78.  18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (2018). 
 79. See Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 226 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(finding that Chrysler Corporation constituted a “person” under the statute). 
 80. See Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1282 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(recognizing that New York law allowed an unincorporated political committee to 
hold property). 
 81. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Caton’s Estate, 540 F. Supp. 673,  
681–82 (N.D. Ind. 1982), overruled by Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 656 F. Supp. 
950 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (finding that RICO liability survives the death of a 
wrongdoer and approving recovery from his estate). 
 82. See, e.g., Jund, 941 F.2d at 1282 (rejecting an argument that 
unincorporated entities could not hold property); State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 682 
(“A construction of RICO that permits full survival against the estate of an alleged 
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limit the statute’s applicability to governments and government 
agencies due to governmental immunity, even though they are 
entities capable of holding property.83 
The next element, the “pattern of racketeering activities,” 
includes a broad range of state and federal crimes—drug 
trafficking, money laundering, murder, kidnapping, gambling, 
bribery, extortion, and sexual exploitation of children, among 
many others.84 These offenses are commonly referred to as RICO 
predicate acts.85 A person engages in a pattern of racketeering 
activities by committing two predicate acts within ten years of each 
other.86 Courts require a relationship between the predicate acts 
and some continuity between the acts in order to prove the pattern 
of racketeering activities.87 As an alternative to proving a pattern 
of racketeering activities, a claimant may also prove that the 
person collected an “unlawful debt”—a gambling debt forbidden 
under state or federal usury laws.88 But this alternative is rarely 
used.89 
As discussed above, an “enterprise” is any legal entity or any 
group of people “associated in fact although not a legal entity.”90 A 
                                                                                                                 
wrongdoer is ‘neither absurd nor surprising.’” (quoting United States v. Turkette, 
452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981))). 
 83.  See Blakey & Blakey, supra note 66, at 38 (“Despite this all-inclusive 
language, the circuits exclude federal and local governmental agencies from those 
who may be sued . . . . Official immunities still apply.”). 
 84.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (cross-referencing other federal criminal statutes 
as well as providing that certain state crimes constitute racketeering activities). 
 85. See, e.g., BROWN & PORTER, supra note 7, at § 3:1 (“[The statute’s] list of 
predicate offenses is exhaustive as well, and conduct that is not among the 
enumerated offenses cannot serve as a predicate to a RICO violation.”). 
 86. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (“‘[P]attern of racketeering activity’ requires at 
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective 
date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding 
any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering 
activity.”). 
 87. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (“[T]he term 
‘pattern’ itself requires the showing of a relationship between the predicates and 
of the threat of continuing activity.” (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970)) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
 88. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (regarding debts incurred in both gambling 
activities and the business of gambling). 
 89. See SMITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 4.05 (“Like most other parts of the 
RICO statute, the definition of unlawful debt is poorly drafted and confusing.”). 
 90. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2018) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual, 
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legal enterprise requires only proof that the entity has a legal 
existence.91 The “very existence of a corporation meets the 
requirement for a separate structure [to prove an enterprise].”92 
An association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that 
functions with a common purpose.93 In order to show that a group 
is an association-in-fact enterprise, the group must have the three 
structural features enumerated by the Supreme Court in Boyle v. 
United States:94 “a purpose, relationships among those associated 
with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these 
associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.”95  
The enterprise’s “purpose” does not require an economic 
motive as long as the enterprise affects interstate or foreign 
commerce.96 For instance, a nonprofit organization sponsoring 
protests to shut down abortion clinics satisfies the purpose 
requirement although the organization does not have an economic 
motivation.97 Under the “relationship” test in Boyle, an 
enterprise-in-fact does not need any specific structure or 
relationship among the parties so long as the individuals are 
associated in fact for a common purpose of engaging in a course of 
conduct.98 The final feature, “longevity,” is satisfied by “proof that 
                                                                                                                 
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or 
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. . . .”). 
 91. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 364 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“[A]ll aspects of the enterprise element are satisfied by the mere proof that the 
entity does in fact have a legal existence.”(quotations omitted)). 
 92.  See Webster v. Omnitrition Int’l, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“The participation of a corporation in a racketeering scheme is sufficient, of itself, 
to give the enterprise a structure separate from the racketeering activity . . . .”). 
 93. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (“The enterprise 
is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a 
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.”). 
 94. 556 U.S. 938 (2009). 
 95. Id. at 946. 
 96.  See Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 261 (1994) 
(“Congress has not, either in the definitional section or in the operative language, 
required that an ‘enterprise’ in § 1962(c) have an economic motive.”). 
 97.  See id. at 258 (“An enterprise surely can have a detrimental influence on 
interstate or foreign commerce without having its own profit-seeking motives.”). 
 98. See Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948 (“[An enterprise-in-fact] group need not have 
a hierarchical structure or a ‘chain of command’; decisions may be made on an ad 
hoc basis and by any number of methods.”). 
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the enterprise had ‘affairs’ of sufficient duration to permit an 
associate to ‘participate’ in those affairs through ‘a pattern of 
racketeering activity.’”99 Judge Posner found sufficient longevity 
in a case where a group defrauded a charitable foundation over the 
course of sixteen years.100 A proponent of a more restrictive reading 
of the statute,101 he begrudgingly recognized that Boyle provides 
only a slight difference between a RICO enterprise and a regular 
conspiracy.102 
The operative section of the statute is divided into four 
subsections: § 1962(a) which prohibits any person from investing 
in an enterprise with proceeds derived from racketeering 
activities;103 § 1962(b) which bars any person from acquiring an 
interest in an enterprise through racketeering activities;104 
§ 1962(c) which outlaws operating an enterprise through 
racketeering activities;105 and § 1962(d) which provides that it is 
unlawful to conspire to violate the other subsections.106 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Id. at 946 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).  
 100.  See Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610 F.3d 382, 
388 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Well, the alleged enterprise in this case had purpose and 
relationships and it certainly had ‘longevity,’ and if Boyle is taken at face value 
nothing more is required to make a conspiracy a RICO enterprise.”). 
 101. See G. Robert Blakey, Time-Bars: RICO-Criminal and Civil-Federal and 
State, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1581, 1783 (2013) (“Surely, Judge Posner was 
aware that the Supreme Court knew precisely what it did when it rejected the 
Bledsoe line of case requiring an ‘ascertainable structure’ as a surrogate for an 
organized crime limitation.”). 
 102. See Hayden Found., 610 F.3d at 388 (arguing that the underlying 
conduct was simply conspiracy, but Boyle required the court to consider it a RICO 
enterprise).  
 103. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2018) (providing that a purchase of securities for 
purposes of investment without the intention of controlling the issuer is not 
considered illegal under certain conditions). 
 104. See id. § 1962(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern 
of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or 
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which 
is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
 105.  See id. § 1962(c)  
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in 
the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
 106.  See id. § 1962(d) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to 
violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”). 
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Subsections 1962(a) and (b) are sometimes referred to as the 
“infiltration” subsections, and § 1962(c) as the “criminally 
operated” enterprise subsection.107 Although the infiltration 
subsections were the primary concern of the legislature,108 the 
criminally operated subsection became the primary vehicle for 
most RICO prosecutions.109 Cryptocurrency crime occupies a 
position between the two most popular uses of RICO—white collar 
crime and organized crime.110 It resembles white collar crime due 
to cryptocurrency’s potential uses in money laundering111 and 
resembles organized crime due to cryptocurrency’s use in drug 
trafficking and sale of illegal goods.112 Prosecutors have already 
attempted a RICO case against a crypto-criminal under the 
operation subsection,113 but whether a crypto-criminal prosecution 
could rely on the infiltration subsections requires an examination 
of how the underlying cryptocurrency technology and network 
function.  
                                                                                                                 
 107.  See Lynch, supra note 8, at 731–32 (categorizing different types of 
prosecutions brought under § 1962). 
 108.  See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 
922 (1970) (“[Organized crime’s] money and power are increasingly used to 
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and 
corrupt our democratic processes . . . .”). 
 109.  See Murner, supra note 67, at 1640 (noting that “§ 1962(a) [and] § 1962(b) 
rarely forms the basis of a RICO action” and § 1962(c) is “the most commonly used 
RICO provision”); see also Lynch, supra note 8, at 731 (“Of the 236 RICO 
indictments discussed in the sample reported appellate cases, 228 of them appear 
to have charged either substantive violations of section 1962(c) or conspiracies to 
commit such violations.”). 
 110.  See Blakey & Blakey, supra note 66, at 43 (noting that organized crime 
and white collar crime represent the majority of RICO prosecutions). 
 111. See Edgar G. Sánchez, Crypto-Currencies: The 21st Century’s Money 
Laundering and Tax Havens, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 169 (2017) (“[T]he 
newest growing concern with Bitcoin, and crypto-currencies in general, [is] their 
ability to wash money and conceal taxable income.”).  
 112. See Press Release, AlphaBay, the Largest Online ‘Dark Market,’ Shut 
Down, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/7CD3-24G6 (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2019) [hereinafter AlphaBay Shut Down] (stating that online dark-web 
marketplaces represent a new form of transnational organized crime) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 113. See Indictment, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 1:17-cr-00144 (E.D. 
Cal. June 1, 2017) (charging Cazes under RICO’s operation subsection and 
outlining the network of cohorts Cazes used to run an illegal online marketplace). 
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C. A Primer on Cryptocurrency 
In 2008, an individual or group under the pseudonym Satoshi 
Nakamoto published a paper that described Bitcoin, a peer-to-peer 
version of electronic cash.114 Nakamoto’s true identity is unknown 
and subject to constant speculation,115 but it is clear that 
Nakamoto designed the network to address failures of financial 
institutions in dealing with internet commerce.116 Bitcoin is a 
virtual currency which relies on a peer-to-peer ledger protocol to 
create a record of bitcoin transfers.117 These transfers are 
documented with pseudo-anonymous identifying information 
recorded in a decentralized ledger known as the blockchain.118 The 
blockchain functions as a distributed public record of all Bitcoin 
transactions, shared with all users of Bitcoin, in order to ensure 
that no individual is able to double spend or falsify information on 
the ledger.119  
                                                                                                                 
 114. See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH 
SYSTEM 1 (2008), https://perma.cc/L35Y-PD58 (PDF) (describing a “peer-to-peer 
version of electronic cash [that] would allow online payments to be sent directly 
from one party to another without going through a financial institution”). 
 115. See Paul Vigna, Is This Satoshi Nakamoto, the Mysterious Creator of 
Bitcoin?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2014, 9:09 AM), https://perma.cc/TD4Q-SVSG (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (discussing a claim by author Leah McGrath that she had 
located a Japanese-American named Satoshi Nakamoto) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Paul Vigna, Craig Wright Claims He Is Bitcoin 
Inventor ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2016, 11:07 PM), 
https://perma.cc/29C3-59CR (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting on a claim by an 
Australian businessman Craig Wright that he is Satoshi Nakamoto) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 116. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 114, at 1 (“While the system [relying on 
financial institutions] works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers 
from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model.”). 
 117. See Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN.ORG, 
https://perma.cc/6GFT-T94N (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“Bitcoin is a consensus 
network that enables a new payment system and a completely digital money.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 118. See Nathaniel Popper, What Is Bitcoin, and How Does It Work?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/WGV3-EV9H (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) 
(“Unlike traditional payment networks like Visa, the Bitcoin network is not run 
by a single company or person. The system is run by a decentralized network of 
computers around the world . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 119. See Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear, BITCOIN.ORG, 
https://perma.cc/24ZT-AQCD (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) [hereinafter Bitcoin 
Vocabulary] (describing the blockchain technology underlying bitcoins and 
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Each Bitcoin user controls a Bitcoin wallet to maintain their 
bitcoins.120 The blockchain keeps track of how many bitcoins exist 
and which users are authorized to spend them.121 Each wallet has 
a private key which allows the user to authorize transfer of the 
bitcoins associated with the wallet.122 When a user authorizes a 
new transaction, the information is broadcast to a network of 
computers, known as miners, which use cryptography to ensure 
that the user is authorized to transfer those bitcoins.123 If the 
transfer checks out, it is added to the blockchain.124 The network 
rewards the miner who successfully confirmed the pending 
transactions with a prize of bitcoins.125 
Though Bitcoin started as a thought experiment, it soon 
proved to have real world buying power when a user paid 10,000 
bitcoins for two pizzas.126 Bitcoin grew in value to a staggering 
peak of almost twenty thousand dollars per bitcoin in December 
2017 before coming back down to earth in the following months.127 
                                                                                                                 
defining Bitcoin wallet as an application that accepts bitcoin sent to a certain 
address, similar to email, and contains a private key proving that the user is 
entitled to spend the bitcoins) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 120. See How Does Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN.ORG, https://perma.cc/7ZZV-CGKH 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (providing information on how to start using Bitcoin) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 121. See id. (“All confirmed transactions are included in the block chain.”). 
 122. See id. (“Bitcoin wallets keep a secret piece of data called a private key 
or seed, which is used to sign transactions, providing a mathematical proof that 
they have come from the owner of the wallet.”). 
 123. See id. (“To be confirmed, transactions must be packed in a block that 
fits very strict cryptographic rules that will be verified by the network.”). 
 124. See id. (“Mining is a distributed consensus system that is used to confirm 
pending transactions by including them in the block chain.”). 
 125. See Bitcoin Vocabulary, supra note 119 (“As a reward for their services, 
Bitcoin miners can collect transaction fees for the transactions they confirm, along 
with newly created bitcoins.”). 
 126. See Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23, 
2011, 2:52 PM), https://perma.cc/8YSF-59LK (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) 
(recounting the first use of bitcoins for a real-world purchase) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 127. See Can Bitcoin Become a Dominant Currency?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 
2018, 10:07 PM), https://perma.cc/RM3W-F3YT (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“The 
price gyrations have come as the cryptocurrency is getting increased scrutiny.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). At Bitcoin’s peak, the 10,000 
bitcoins originally spent on two pizzas would have been worth 197.8 million 
dollars. 
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It spawned a new universe of cryptocurrencies, and the entire 
industry peaked in value at $829 billion in early 2018.128 In order 
to facilitate cryptocurrency trading, new online exchanges opened 
that allowed customers to trade cryptocurrencies for other 
cryptocurrencies or conventional currencies.129 As the technology 
progressed, new cryptocurrencies focused on improving perceived 
weaknesses in the Bitcoin model. For example, Monero focus on 
providing fully anonymous transactions.130 
The underlying blockchain technology behind cryptocurrency 
may also have a future in other sectors.131 The technology could be 
used to update traditional ledger systems in any industry that uses 
ledgers to keep track of ownership, including real estate.132 A 
Goldman Sachs study suggests that blockchain’s use in land titles 
could save the title insurance industry up to four billion dollars by 
reducing manual searches and accompanying errors.133 The same 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See Aaron Hankin, The Cryptocurrency Market Has Shed More Than 
$600 Billion From Its Peak—What Exactly Happened?, MARKET WATCH (Aug. 15, 
2018, 8:27 AM), https://perma.cc/A3R9-XVTD (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) 
(discussing market capitalization losses in the cryptocurrency industry) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 129. See, e.g., About Coinbase, COINBASE, https://perma.cc/YV6W-TDZP (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“Coinbase is a digital currency wallet and platform where 
merchants and consumers can transact with new digital currencies like bitcoin, 
ethereum, and litecoin.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 130.  See Home, MONERO, https://perma.cc/S5RN-HT6P (last visited Nov. 5, 
2019) (“Monero uses ring signatures, ring confidential transactions, and stealth 
addresses to obfuscate the origins, amounts, and destinations of all 
transactions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 131.  See Reade Ryan & Mayme Donohue, Securities on Blockchain, 73 BUS. 
LAW. 85, 92 (2018) (discussing Overstock.com’s use of blockchain technology in 
offering securities); Maksymilian Ewendt, Note, Leveraging Blockchain 
Technology in Property Records: Establishing Trust in A Risk-Filled Market, 19 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 99, 105 (2017) (“Real property is a segment of the 
economy that holds a tremendous amount of wealth, similar to currency, and 
similarly could be primed for an influx of technological innovation.”); Stephen J. 
Obie & Mark W. Rasmussen, How Regulation Could Help Cryptocurrencies Grow, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/56E4-FPVS (last visited Nov. 5, 
2019) (discussing how securities law might apply to cryptocurrency) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 132. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 873–74 
(2015) (“[Blockchain networks] offer the possibility of decentralized and secure 
ledgers to maintain digital property, currency, county land records, mortgage 
interests, security interests, stock ownership, and much more.”). 
 133. See GOLDMAN SACHS, PROFILES IN INNOVATION: BLOCKCHAIN—PUTTI N G 
THEORY INTO PRACTICE 5 (May 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/5GUM-2VBX (PDF) (“In 
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study suggested sizable cost savings for other industries if they 
adopt blockchain technology, including the electricity industry, the 
sharing economy, cash securities, and anti-money laundering and 
know-your-customer compliance.134 The cryptocurrency industry’s 
success in dealing with its criminal element could affect other 
industries’ adoption of the technology.135 With these rapid 
developments as a backdrop, prosecutors did not wait for the 
industry to self-regulate and have already turned their focus on 
cryptocurrency. 
III. The Current Methods of Prosecuting Cryptocurrency 
Criminals  
A. RICO Prosecution of Alexandre Cazes 
On June 1, 2017, a grand jury from the Eastern District of 
California indicted Alexandre Cazes on charges stemming from his 
creation and operation of AlphaBay, a dark-web marketplace for 
illegal goods, controlled substances, and illegal services.136 The 
indictment charged Cazes with conspiracy to engage in a RICO 
violation, as well as fifteen other counts.137 On July 4, 2017, 
authorities seized control of AlphaBay and shut down traffic to the 
                                                                                                                 
emerging markets, land registration systems could help reduce transaction and 
financing costs.”). 
 134.  See id. at 4–5 (“When we consider these applications in real-world 
scenarios, the dollar benefits start to become apparent.”). 
 135. Matthew B. Hoy, An Introduction to the Blockchain and Its Implications 
for Libraries and Medicine, MED. REFERENCE SERVS. Q., 2017, Vol. 36, No. 3,  
273–79 (“Whether the blockchain can overcome this outlaw image and develop to 
its full potential as an information storage and verification system remains to be 
seen.”). 
 136. See Indictment at ¶¶ 1–8, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 1:17-cr-00144 
(E.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) (charging Cazes for his part in operating AlphaBay). 
 137. See id. at 10–22 (charging RICO conspiracy, narcotics conspiracy, six 
counts of distribution of a controlled substance, conspiracy to commit identity 
theft and fraud related to identification documents, four counts of unlawful 
transfer of a false identification document, conspiracy to commit access device 
fraud, trafficking in device making equipment, and money laundering 
conspiracy). 
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website.138 Soon after, authorities arrested Cazes in Thailand.139 A 
week later, Cazes killed himself in an apparent suicide while in the 
custody of officers from the Narcotics Suppression Bureau in 
Thailand.140 Due to Cazes’s suicide, the case never progressed to 
trial and prosecutors dismissed the indictment.141 The judge 
presiding over the ensuing civil forfeiture case granted a default 
judgment and found the government alleged sufficient facts to 
prove a link between Cazes’s assets and racketeering activities.142  
The indictment’s outline of AlphaBay’s operation shows an 
online version of traditional organized crime organization, 
including numerous subordinate associates engaging in drug 
trafficking, forging documents, and money laundering through 
Cazes’s platform.143 A large portion of Cazes’s proceeds from the 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See AlphaBay Shut Down, supra note 112 (announcing the seizure of 
AlphaBay and the arrest of Alexandre Cazes); AlphaBay Seizure Notice, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (July 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/KK7X-3XT4 (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) 
(“[This hidden site has been seized] [s]ince July 4, 2017 as part of a law 
enforcement operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration and European law enforcement agencies acting 
through Europol . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 139. See AlphaBay Shut Down, supra note 112 (describing Thai authorities’ 
cooperation in the arrest). 
 140. See Ngamkham, supra note 34 (reporting that an officer found Cazes 
hanged in his cell with no signs of struggle). 
 141. See Order To Dismiss Indictment, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 
1:17-cr-00144 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2018) (dismissing Cazes indictment); see also 
William Sassani, Court Rules in Favor of Federal Government in Forfeiture of 
Assets Related to Darknet Website, N. CAL. RECORD (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/8ZBT-6LNW (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (discussing the following 
civil forfeiture action against Cazes’s estate) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 142. See United States v. 2013 Lamborghini Aventador LP700-4, No. 
117-CV-00967 LJO SKO, 2018 WL 3752131, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2018) 
(granting default judgment and forfeiture of Cazes’s assets, including several 
cryptocurrency wallets, bank accounts, real estate, and a 2013 Lamborghini 
Aventador). 
 143. See Indictment at ¶ 12, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 1:17-cr-00144 
(E.D. Cal. June 1, 2017)  
Members and associates of [AlphaBay] distributed, and facilitated the 
distribution of, controlled substances, . . . distributed, and facilitated 
the distribution of, counterfeit and stolen identification 
documents, . . . [and] laundered money . . . by maintaining and 
controlling digital currency addresses through which customers paid 
vendors on the AlphaBay website. 
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website were held in various cryptocurrencies144 and AlphaBay’s 
operation relied entirely on cryptocurrencies for payment.145 The 
RICO conspiracy charge was predicated on fraud in connection 
with identification documents,146 fraud in connection with access 
devices,147 money laundering,148 and narcotics trafficking.149  
In cases involving cryptocurrency, investigators face 
difficulties in overcoming the anonymous nature of 
cryptocurrencies to pinpoint the identity of a suspect.150 In Cazes’s 
case, reports indicate that investigators capitalized on a small 
window of opportunity to identify Cazes and capture control of 
AlphaBay and his cryptocurrencies.151 In either a mistake or 
oversight, Cazes used his own personal Hotmail account at one 
point during the operation of the marketplace, providing the initial 
                                                                                                                 
 144. See Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem, United States v. Cazes, 
Case No. 1:17-at-00557 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2017) (listing Cazes’s assets including 
large sums of bitcoin, etherium, zcash and monero). 
 145. See Indictment at ¶ 3, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 1:17-cr-00144 
(E.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) (“AlphaBay required its users to transact in digital 
currencies, including Bitcoin, Morrero, and Ethereum. The site did not allow for 
transactions in official, government-backed currencies.”). 
 146. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2018) (prohibiting knowing transfer or possession 
of fraudulent identification documents). 
 147.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (prohibiting fraud in connection with access devices, 
i.e. credit and debit cards). 
 148.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (prohibiting concealment or disguising “the 
nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity”). 
 149. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 843, and 846 (prohibiting manufacture, 
distribution, dispensation, or possession of controlled substances; use of a 
communication facility in furtherance thereof; and conspiracy to commit the 
same).  
 150. See Thomas Brewster, FBI Has 130 Cryptocurrency-Related 
Investigations, Agent Says, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/6GG8-WBF6 (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (citing statements by 
Kyle Armstrong, a supervisory special agent of the FBI, regarding the pros and 
cons of investigating cryptocurrency criminals) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 151. See Thomas Brewster, How the Cops Took Down an Alleged $23 Million 
Dark Web Drug Kingpin, FORBES (July 20, 2017, 02:30 PM), 
https://perma.cc/F2BR-F5PA (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting on the raid that 
captured Alexandre Cazes and his open laptop, with access to AlphaBay’s 
administrative functions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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link to his identity.152 This seemingly minor slip-up demonstrates 
the difficulty of prosecuting cryptocurrency criminals: 
investigators must catch a cryptocurrency criminal by finding 
instances of human error.153 Even with such an error, an 
investigator needs extensive knowledge of the cryptocurrency 
network and identification of a user can be nearly impossible 
without outside information, such as an associated email or 
information from service providers.154  
In order to help identify the enterprise behind AlphaBay, 
investigators shut down AlphaBay shortly before the raid in order 
to ensure that Cazes was logged in as an administrator at the time 
officials seized his computer.155 Had this seizure technique failed 
and left prosecutors unable to access AlphaBay’s network 
administrator functions, this Note’s proposed alternative would 
enable prosecutors to rely on Cazes’s infiltration of the various 
cryptocurrency networks with ill-gotten gains to prove the 
enterprise element of a RICO prosecution.156 Still, RICO cases 
regarding cryptocurrencies are rare and RICO is not the exclusive 
tool for prosecuting cryptocurrency criminals engaged in 
enterprises.  
                                                                                                                 
 152.  See id. (speculating that Cazes’s email  
address—Pimp_Alex_91@hotmail.com—was compromised during data breaches 
involving MySpace and LinkedIn). 
 153. See generally NICK FURNEAUX, INVESTIGATING CRYPTOCURRENCI E S: 
UNDERSTANDING, EXTRACTING, AND ANALYZING BLOCKCHAIN EVIDENCE 119–267 
(2018) (discussing investigative methods used to prosecute cryptocurrency 
criminals).  
 154.  See id. at 244 (“Finding a suspect in the real world from blockchain 
transactions can be very challenging, and unless you are able to make legal 
requests for information from service providers, it can be almost impossible.”); see 
also Nina Marino et al., The Dark Side of Bitcoin, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2018, at 36, 40 
(regarding the use of confidential informants and undercover investigations in 
cryptocurrency investigations). 
 155. See BREWSTER, supra note 151 (“Just before they swooped 
on . . . Cazes . . . , the cops forced the site to go down, leading the suspect to login 
to the market’s server and start communicating with the AlphaBay data 
centers . . . .”). 
 156. See infra Part IV (discussing prosecution of cryptocurrency criminals 
using the cryptocurrency network as the enterprise). 
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B. RICO Alternatives 
Ross Ulbricht operated Silk Road, an online marketplace that 
preceded AlphaBay and sold drugs and other illegals goods using 
bitcoins as its exclusive payment system.157 Instead of prosecuting 
under RICO, prosecutors employed the Continuing Criminal 
Enterprise (CCE) statute.158 The CCE statute shares a similar 
structure with RICO and enables prosecution if the accused 
occupied a supervisory position over at least five other individuals 
and obtained substantial income or resources.159 However, 
prosecutions under CCE are limited to prosecutions of federal drug 
offenses against drug kingpins.160 By comparison, RICO retains a 
much more flexible application due to the statute’s broad language 
and inclusive definition of racketeering activities.161 While CCE 
prosecutions may suit online drug kingpins, employing RICO 
against cryptocurrency criminals as this Note suggests will result 
in a streamlining of the investigation methods against 
cryptocurrency criminals because the enterprise element can be 
the same in each case.162  
Prosecutors may also choose to ignore any potential RICO 
concerns, exercise prosecutorial discretion, and charge only the 
underlying predicate crimes. In 2014, a New York grand jury 
charged Bitcoin entrepreneurs Charlie Shrem and Robert Faiella 
with operating an unlicensed money transmitting business and 
                                                                                                                 
 157. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(summarizing Ulbricht’s conviction for drug trafficking associated with his 
website, Silk Road), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018).  
 158. See Indictment, United States v. Ulbricht, Case No. 1:14-cr-00068 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2014) (charging Ross with crimes stemming from his operation 
of Silk Road). 
 159. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2018) (providing higher penalties for committing 
two or more violations of controlled substances statutes in a position of 
management over five or more other persons). 
 160. See Susan W. Brenner, S.C.A.R.F.A.C.E.: A Speculation on Double 
Jeopardy and Compound Criminal Liability, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 936 (1993) 
(“Given these limitations, CCE might properly be termed a ‘minor RICO 
statute.’”). 
 161. See id. (“RICO can be used against anyone who commits, facilitates or 
agrees to the commission of ‘racketeering activity.’”). 
 162. See infra Part IV (discussing how investigation of bitcoin usage can prove 
the investments of proceeds and the enterprise required for a RICO violation). 
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conspiring to commit money laundering in connection with drug 
purchases on Silk Road.163 Both charged crimes are RICO 
predicate crimes.164 Faiella operated a Bitcoin exchange on Silk 
Road, and Schrem used his position at another Bitcoin exchange to 
anonymously provide the bitcoins for Faiella’s exchange.165 The 
indictment also indicated that both Faiella and Schrem operated 
the scheme as a business, which might have satisfied the RICO 
enterprise requirement.166 Three years later, a California grand 
jury indicted another bitcoin entrepreneur, Alexander Vinnik, on 
nineteen counts under the same statutes and two counts of 
engaging in unlawful monetary transactions.167 Vinnik oversaw 
BTC-e, a cryptocurrency exchange which allowed users to 
anonymously exchange cryptocurrencies for conventional 
currencies and failed to comply with anti-money-laundering and 
know-your-customer laws.168 Despite the potential applicability of 
RICO, prosecutors did not secure an indictment under the statute 
for either case.  
In light of the broad applicability of RICO, the DOJ created 
requirements for authorizing the use of RICO that limit its use. 
                                                                                                                 
 163. See Indictment, United States v. Faiella, Case No. 1:14-cr-00243-JSR 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2014), ECF No. 17 (charging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 
and 1960); see also Press Release, Bitcoin Exchangers Plead Guilty in Manhattan 
Federal Court in Connection with the Sale of Approximately $1 Million in Bitcoins 
for Use on the Silk Road Website, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, S. DIST. OF N.Y. (Sept. 
4, 2014), https://perma.cc/4HVL-S9L2 (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (discussing the 
resulting guilty pleas of Robert Faiella and Charlie Shrem) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 164. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2018) (“‘[R]acketeering activities means . . . any 
act which is indictable under . . . section 1956 (relating to the laundering of 
monetary instruments) . . . [and] section 1960 (relating to illegal money 
transmitters) . . . .”).  
 165. See Indictment, United States v. Faiella, Case No. 1:14-cr-00243-JSR 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2014), ECF No. 17 (alleging that Faiella operated the exchange 
under the username “BTCKing,” and that Shrem knew he was facilitating Silk 
Road transactions).  
 166. See id. (alleging that Faiella and Schrem operated a money transmitting 
business affecting interstate commerce). 
 167. See Superseding Indictment, United States v. BTC-E, Case No. CR 
16-00227 SI (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) (discussing Alexander Vinnik’s operation of 
a digital currency exchange and his alleged involvement in ransomware attacks, 
drug trafficking, identity theft, fraud, and money laundering). 
 168. See id. at ¶¶ 32–43.  
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Any prosecution of cryptocurrency criminals must satisfy these 
requirements: 
[A] government attorney should seek approval for a RICO 
charge only if one or more of the following requirements is 
present: 
1. RICO is necessary to ensure that the indictment 
adequately reflects the nature and extent of the 
criminal conduct involved in a way that prosecution 
only on the underlying charges would not; 
2. A RICO prosecution would provide the basis for an 
appropriate sentence under all the circumstances of the 
case in a way that prosecution only on the underlying 
charges would not; 
3. A RICO charge could combine related offenses which 
would otherwise have to be prosecuted separately in 
different jurisdictions; 
4. RICO is necessary for a successful prosecution of the 
government’s case against the defendant or a 
codefendant; 
5. Use of RICO would provide a reasonable expectation of 
forfeiture which is proportionate to the underlying 
criminal conduct; 
6. The case consists of violations of State law, but local law 
enforcement officials are unlikely or unable to 
successfully prosecute the case, in which the federal 
government has a significant interest; 
7. The case consists of violations of State law, but involves 
prosecution of significant or government individuals,  
which may pose special problems for the local 
prosecutor.169 
These factors address the DOJ’s concerns regarding potential 
prosecutorial overreach through RICO and ensure that RICO is 
only used when necessary.170 It is possible that the activities of 
                                                                                                                 
 169.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-110.310 (2020). 
 170.  See id. at § 9-110.200 (“Despite the broad statutory language of RICO 
and the legislative intent that the statute ‘. . . shall be liberally construed to 
effectuate its remedial purpose,’ it is the policy of the Criminal Division that RICO 
be selectively and uniformly used.”). 
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Faiella, Schrem, and Vinnik simply did not meet these 
requirements.  
IV. Cryptocurrencies as the “Enterprise” 
Cryptocurrency criminals have infiltrated a legitimate 
enterprise: the Bitcoin network. This Note proposes protecting 
legitimate enterprises like Bitcoin with a novel alternative for 
prosecuting cryptocurrency criminals. Prosecutors should use the 
cryptocurrency network relationship to support prosecution under 
§ 1962(a), which bars infiltration of an enterprise through 
racketeering activities.171 In this scenario, the cryptocurrency and 
its users are “the victim of the activity” of criminals considered by 
§ 1962(a) of the RICO statute.172 Under this proposal, the 
prosecutor’s investigation of a criminal’s use of cryptocurrency will 
satisfy both the investment requirements and the enterprise 
requirement of § 1962(a).173 This approach reinvigorates RICO’s 
initial purpose stated in the statute’s legislative history: to prevent 
the infiltration of legitimate enterprises.174 It also lowers the 
investigatory resources required to demonstrate the “enterprise.” 
Instead of having to investigate the relationships among the 
associates of the criminal enterprise,175 prosecutors will be able to 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2018) 
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income 
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering 
activity . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such 
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest 
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce. 
 172. See Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259 (1994) 
(“The ‘enterprise’ referred to in subsections (a) and (b) is thus something acquired 
through the use of illegal activities or by money obtained from illegal activities. 
The enterprise in these subsections is the victim of unlawful activity . . . .”). 
 173. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2018) (regarding investment in enterprises with 
racketeering proceeds). 
 174.  See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (“[T]itle 
IX is aimed at removing organized crime from our legitimate organizations.”). 
 175. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009) (requiring 
prosecutors to show group members are “associated together for a common 
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct” in order to prove an association-in-fact 
enterprise). 
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rely on publicly available information in order to prove the 
enterprise.176  
 A. Criminal Prosecution of Cryptocurrency Criminals Under 
§ 1962(a) 
The government can prove a criminal violation of § 1962(a) by 
showing “the existence of an enterprise, the defendant’s derivation 
of income from a pattern of racketeering activity, and the use of 
any part of that income in acquiring an interest in or operating the 
enterprise.”177 A civil plaintiff must also show causation between 
the investment and an injury in order to have standing.178  
1.  The Enterprise Requirement 
The enterprise requirement should be satisfied by the 
cryptocurrency and its network of users.179 Cryptocurrencies are 
not legal entities. The status of an enterprise as a legal association 
depends on its legal existence as a corporation, partnership, or 
other legal entity.180 Bitcoin, the original cryptocurrency, does not 
                                                                                                                 
 176. See infra Section IV.A.1 (discussing the association requirements for 
cryptocurrencies). 
 177. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 178. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2018) (“Any person injured in his business or 
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor 
in any appropriate United States district court . . . .”); see also N. Cypress Med. 
Ctr. Operating Co. v. Cigna Healthcare, 781 F.3d 182, 202 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 441 (5th Cir. 2000)) 
To state a claim under § 1962(a), North Cypress had to plead: “(1) the 
existence of an enterprise, (2) the defendant’s derivation of income from 
a pattern of racketeering activity, and (3) the use of any part of that 
income in acquiring an interest in or operating the enterprise.” 
Additionally, North Cypress had to show a nexus between the claimed 
violations and injury. 
 179. See 556 U.S. at 946 (“[A]n association-in-fact enterprise must have at 
least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated 
with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue 
the enterprise’s purpose.”). 
 180. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 364 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(providing the standard of proof for the legal existence of a corporation, 
partnership, or other legal entities). 
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exist as a legal entity in any form, but rather exists simply as an 
open source protocol181 with individual bitcoins considered a 
commodity.182 With other cryptocurrencies relying on similar 
blockchain protocols,183 each cryptocurrency network itself is 
typically not a legal entity even if some cryptocurrencies are 
associated with legal entities.184  
Cryptocurrencies should constitute an association-in-fact 
enterprise under Boyle because they have the “three [required] 
structural features: a purpose, relationships among those 
associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit 
these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.”185 First, the 
purpose of cryptocurrencies is to function as an alternative form of 
currency.186 They provide several benefits over traditional 
currencies including lower costs, easier transferability, and less 
risk by eliminating double spending.187 All users, legitimate and 
illegitimate, work together towards the common purpose of 
keeping track of Bitcoin transactions.188 
                                                                                                                 
 181. See Who Owns Bitcoin.org?, About Bitcoin.org, BITCOIN.ORG, 
https://perma.cc/WK8W-YUT9 (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (providing that no one 
owns Bitcoin because it is a protocol and that the network requires consensus 
between all the platform’s users) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 182.  See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 
213, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Virtual currencies can be regulated by CFTC as a 
commodity.”). 
 183.  See, e.g., TETHER LTD., TETHER: FIAT CURRENCIES ON THE BITCOIN 
BLOCKCHAIN (2016), https://perma.cc/A4AW-SWSZ (PDF) (describing Tether, a 
cryptocurrency-fiat currency hybrid which “exist[s] on the Bitcoin blockchain”). 
 184. See, e.g., Contact Us, TETHER, https://perma.cc/HTE8-GNT5 (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2019) (noting Tether Limited, the legal entity that controls Tether 
cryptocurrency, “is incorporated in Hong Kong”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 185. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946. 
 186. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 114, at 1 (describing a bitcoin as electronic 
cash). 
 187. See Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency 
Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 282 (2015) (“The most 
commonly cited benefits of bitcoin are: (1) lower costs and fees, (2) fewer risks for 
merchants, (3) increased anonymity for users, (4) increased speed and ease of 
transfer/payment, and (5) less susceptibility to government manipulation and 
inflationary pressures.”). 
 188. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 114, at 3 (setting out the Bitcoin network and 
how transactions will be verified). 
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Second, the relationship among those associated with a 
cryptocurrency enterprise occurs naturally as a result of the 
creation of the blockchain and consensus network of 
cryptocurrency.189 Each transaction between Bitcoin users is 
registered in the blockchain, a “record of all the debits, credits and 
balances associated with each unique bitcoin address.”190 Each 
transfer is broadcasted to the Bitcoin network, where it is 
examined by miners—computers which gather the information 
from the transaction and ensure that it matches the previous 
transactions before adding it to the blockchain.191 Upon 
successfully adding the new transaction to the blockchain, the 
miner is rewarded with a small amount of bitcoin.192 Thus, each 
Bitcoin transaction represents a relationship between at least 
three users: the sender of the bitcoin, the recipient of the bitcoin, 
and the miner.193 Each transaction requires this relationship, 
constantly deepening the web of relationships amongst the users 
of the Bitcoin enterprise.194 
Finally, cryptocurrency networks show longevity because they 
are intended as a long-term alternative to currency.195 The last 
Bitcoin prize for mining will not be issued until approximately 
2140.196 Bitcoin is designed to serve as an alternative to traditional 
                                                                                                                 
 189. See PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRE N C Y  
121–37 (2015) (describing an interconnected network of users and the public 
ledger system that underlies cryptocurrencies). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See id. at 129 (“The miner’s software client takes the hash of the first 
transaction—with the pool of underlying date contained within it—and combines 
it with the raw data of the next unhashed transaction to form a new hash.”). 
 192. See id. (discussing the reasons for bitcoin miners to expend computing 
power to assist with the maintenance of the network). 
 193. See id. at 130 (discussing the requirement of consensus between the 
information provided by the sender and the information found on the blockchain 
by the miner before the payment to the recipient is confirmed). 
 194. See id. at 131 (“[T]he latest block is now mathematically linked to the 
blockchain, as if to form the latest in an ever growing line of trailer hitches.”).  
 195. See Eric Lam & Lauren Leatherby, From Pizza to Lambos: Charting 
Bitcoin’s First Decade, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/R56G-MBE4 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (charting the use of bitcoins from 2008 through 2018) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 196. See Evelyn Cheng, There Are Now 17 Million Bitcoins in Existence—Only 
4 Million Left to ‘Mine’, CNBC (Apr. 26, 2018, 2:26 PM), 
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currency197 and the network has already existed for over ten 
years.198 The network’s long-term focus on serving as an 
alternative to traditional financial institutions demonstrates 
longevity sufficient to pursue its purpose.199 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the statute’s 
broad applicability should not extend to absurd results.200 In order 
to distinguish absurd results from a proper application of the 
statute, Chief Judge Posner analyzed how closely an alleged 
enterprise resembled a “prototypical” RICO enterprise.201 First, 
the court defined a prototypical case: where a criminal seizes 
control of a legitimate firm and uses the firm to engage in criminal 
acts.202 Cryptocurrency criminals do not satisfy this prototypical 
case because they do not control the entire cryptocurrency 
network.203 The court describes the next closest case as one where 
the criminal uses the enterprise to conduct criminal activities, but 
the enterprise continues its legitimate operations.204 Judge Posner 
noted that such a situation is close to the prototypical case and falls 
                                                                                                                 
https://perma.cc/LN2Q-ENMS (last updated Apr. 30, 2018, 2:33 P.M.) (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2019) (“The remaining 4 million coins aren’t expected to be mined 
completely for another 122 years.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 197.  See NAKAMOTO, supra note 114, at 1 (proposing peer-to-peer electronic 
cash to avoid using financial institutions). 
 198. See Lam & Leatherby, supra note 195 (reporting on Bitcoin’s creation in 
2008 and the first transaction for two pizzas in 2010). 
 199. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009) (requiring “longevity 
sufficient to permit [the] associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose”). 
 200. See Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 226 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(“When a statute is broadly worded in order to prevent loopholes from being 
drilled in it by ingenious lawyers, there is a danger of its being applied to 
situations absurdly remote from the concerns of the statute’s framers.”). 
 201. Id. at 227. 
 202. See id. (discussing how a criminal could “uses the firm’s resources, 
contacts, facilities, and appearance of legitimacy to perpetrate more, and less 
easily discovered, criminal acts than he could do in his own person”).  
 203.  See Camila Russo, Bitcoin Speculators, Not Drug Dealers, Dominate 
Crypto Use Now, BLOOMBERG (August 7, 2018, 7:15 AM), 
https://perma.cc/YR68-8DDH (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (interviewing Drug 
Enforcement Administration Agent Lilita Infante who reported that illegal 
activity constitutes approximately ten percent of cryptocurrency transactions) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 204. See Fitzgerald, 116 F.3d at 227 (“[M]any of the employees of the business 
may be unaware that it is controlled and being used by a criminal.”). 
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under the auspices of the statute.205 Cryptocurrency crime fits 
squarely into this category, with criminals representing a sizable, 
but not overwhelming, portion of the cryptocurrency network.206 
Further concerns about including cryptocurrency networks 
under an expansive reading of the statute can be dispelled by 
examining the guidance of Boyle, which provided: 
Such a[n enterprise] need not have a hierarchical structure or a 
“chain of command”; decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis 
and by any number of methods—by majority vote, consensus, a 
show of strength, etc. Members of the group need not have fixed 
roles; different members may perform different roles at 
different times. The group need not have a name, regular 
meetings, dues, established rules and regulations, disciplinary 
procedures, or induction or initiation ceremonies. While the 
group must function as a continuing unit and remain in 
existence long enough to pursue a course of conduct, nothing in 
RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in spurts 
of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence.207 
Given the Court’s endorsement of consensus decision-making and 
exhaustive list of inessential features, the relationships among 
cryptocurrency users should be sufficient to demonstrate that the 
network is “a group of persons associated together for a common 
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.”208 
2.  Investment or Use in an Enterprise 
Keeping with RICO’s broad construction requirement,209 the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that “[t]he key operative 
                                                                                                                 
 205. See id. (“The second step is to determine how close to the prototype the 
case before the court is—how close, in other words, the family resemblance is 
between the prototypical case and the case at hand.”). 
 206. See Sean Foley et. al., Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity 
is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?, 32 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1798, 1800 (2019) 
(“[A]pproximately one-quarter of all users (26%) and close to one-half of bitcoin 
transactions (46%) are associated with illegal activity.”). 
 207.  Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948 (emphasis added). 
 208.  Id. at 946 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)). 
 209. See United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1194 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding 
that there is no rigorous amount of proof required to tie together the crime, the 
proceeds and the use or investment). 
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terms of the section [regarding investment of proceeds] are 
expansive, not restrictive ones: ‘use or invest,’ ‘any part,’ 
‘income . . . or . . . proceeds,’ ‘directly or indirectly,’ ‘establishment 
or operation.’”210 This same sentiment is echoed in a later Second 
Circuit opinion, which stated that “the numerous disjuncts in 
§ 1962(a) create a broad prohibition.”211 To illustrate how the 
statute might apply: Alexandre Cazes “used” the “proceeds” of the 
drug sales and other “racketeering activities” on AlphaBay directly 
in the “operation” of the Bitcoin network—the “enterprise”—by 
requiring AlphaBay users to pay in bitcoins, making the Bitcoin 
network track and verify each transaction, and storing the 
proceeds of the transactions in bitcoins.212 Typically, the reason not 
to proceed under § 1962(a) is that it is difficult to track and prove 
the investment.213 The same concern does not apply to Bitcoin 
transactions because the network stores a public record of every 
prior transaction.214 In order to connect a Bitcoin wallet to an 
individual, an investigator must tie a private Bitcoin user’s private 
information to a public transaction record.215 But once the 
connection is made, the investigator will have an easier time 
proving that the bitcoins were used in an illicit transaction and 
that the proceeds of the transaction were used in the Bitcoin 
network enterprise.216 
Despite apparently being allowed under Turkette, 
association-in-fact enterprises thus far do not appear in § 1962(a) 
cases.217 This may be because § 1962(a) cases are rare.218 Some 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Id.  
 211. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 652 F.3d 310, 322 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 212. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2018). 
 213.  See Lynch, supra note 8, at 691 (asserting that it is usually difficult and 
burdensome to prove the connection between the racketeering activities and the 
investment). 
 214.  See Blockchain Explorer, supra note 38 (showing the entire blockchain 
history of Bitcoin). 
 215. See generally FURNEAUX, supra note 153 (discussing investigative 
methods used to prosecute cryptocurrency criminals).  
 216. See Marino, supra note 154, 40–41 (discussing the government’s tracing 
methods once an investigator has identified illicit usage of cryptocurrency). 
 217. See SMITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 3.02 (asserting that the Court’s 
argument in Turkette is so obviously incorrect that federal prosecutors have not 
tested its bounds). 
 218.  See id. at § 5.02 (“[S]ection 1962(a) attracted little notice from 
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commentators argue that the Turkette decision is absurd when 
applied to § 1962(a) and (b) because RICO would punish racketeers 
for investing racketeer proceeds back into their own illegal 
association-in-fact enterprises.219 Three reasons reduce this 
concern when applying the statute to cryptocurrency criminals. 
First, the statute contains a single definition for enterprise, 
which includes both legal and association-in-fact enterprises.220 It 
is difficult to see how the “enterprise” under one subsection is 
somehow different than the “enterprise” under a different 
subsection, when both subsections rely on the exact same 
definition.221 Second, a crypto-criminal is using a legitimate 
enterprise, the cryptocurrency network.222 One district court 
recognized that proving a legitimate association-in-fact enterprise 
is theoretically possible and seemingly fits within the language 
and purpose of the statute.223 Finally, Boyle reaffirmed the 
Supreme Court’s commitment to broadly construe RICO to 
effectuate its remedial purposes.224 If applied to cryptocurrencies 
under § 1962(a), the statute is still being used to eliminate 
criminal influences on legitimate enterprises in harmony with its 
purpose.225 
                                                                                                                 
prosecutors.”). 
 219.  See id. at § 3.02 (“The Court did not deign to explain what possible 
purpose could be served by prohibiting racketeers from investing ill-gotten income 
in their illegal businesses . . . .”) 
 220.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2018) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual, 
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or 
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity . . . .”). 
 221. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981) (rejecting the 
argument that each subsection of the statute addresses a different type of 
enterprise, legitimate or illegitimate). 
 222.  See supra Part II.C (concerning the legitimate uses of cryptocurrency). 
 223. See Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 777 F. Supp. 1043, 1055 (D.P.R. 1991), 
aff’d sub nom. Rodriguez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 990 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1993) (“A 
plaintiff could conceivably prove an association-in-fact that is completely 
legitimate except for the fact that one of its associates is using the entity, even 
perhaps without the knowledge of any of the other associates, for the purpose of 
engaging in the RICO predicate act pattern . . . .”). 
 224. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (“[T]he very concept 
of an association in fact is expansive.”). 
 225. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591 (“[T]he legislative history forcefully 
supports the view that the major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration 
of legitimate business by organized crime.”). 
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If criminal RICO works under this concept, civil complainants 
face yet another barrier to using cryptocurrencies to support their 
RICO cases. In order to establish standing, civil RICO plaintiffs in 
a majority of circuits must allege that they suffered an “investment 
injury” resulting from the investment or use of the proceeds in the 
enterprise.226 Given the fluctuating markets of cryptocurrencies,227 
plaintiffs may have difficulties showing the connection between a 
criminal’s use of a cryptocurrency and an injury that is concrete 
and particularized enough to allow standing.228 
B. Potential Bars to Cryptocurrencies as an Enterprise-in-Fact 
1. Cryptocurrency as the Enterprise Will Likely Not Work Under 
§ 1962(c) 
Although RICO has been liberally construed,229 the Supreme 
Court instituted a requirement for how much control an individual 
must have over a criminally operated enterprise in Reves v. Ernst 
& Young.230 Subsection 1962(c) prohibits any person from 
participating in an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity.231 In interpreting the statute in Reves, the 
                                                                                                                 
 226. See SMITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 6.04(6)(a) (“The First, Second, 
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held 
that an investment injury is required under section 1962(a). The Fourth Circuit 
has held otherwise.” (citations omitted)). 
 227. See Jeremy Swinfen Green, Understanding Cryptocurrency Market 
Fluctuations, TELEGRAPH (July 19, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://perma.cc/4TPC-89UC 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“Volatility, recent hacks and the threat of taxation all 
add to the uncertainties surrounding [cryptocurrencies].”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 228. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (requiring an 
injury that is “concrete and particularized”). 
 229. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (discussing 
the legislative history of the statute and Congress’s “self-consciously expansive 
language and overall approach”). 
 230. 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) (holding that “‘to conduct or participate, directly 
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs,’ [under] § 1962(c), one 
must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself”). 
 231. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2018) 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
REINVESTING IN RICO 545 
  
Court approved of an “operation or management” test requiring a 
RICO target to “participate in the operation or management of the 
enterprise itself.”232 The required degree of control over the 
operation or management of the enterprise is currently unclear, 
with courts finding participation when a company exercised “some 
direction over” the members of an enterprise233 but not when a 
maintenance worker “transported some stolen beer and lamps to 
buyers and returned most of the proceeds from the sales to [a drug 
dealer].”234 This lack of clarity may discourage the proposed 
prosecution, which can be remedied by instead using § 1962(a) for 
prosecution of cryptocurrency criminals.235 
In Reves, the Court distinguished subsection (c) of the statute 
from subsections (a) and (b) on the grounds that (c) governed 
individuals with some level of control in the enterprise, while (a) 
and (b) governed individuals outside of the enterprise.236 Thus, the 
operation or management test is not a bar to the proposed 
prosecution if employed in a § 1962(a) claim.  
2. Prosecutorial Discretion and the Justice Manual 
Given RICO’s broad statutory language, the DOJ recognizes 
that every case that meets the statute’s technical requirements 
                                                                                                                 
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in 
the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
 232. Reves, 507 U.S. at 184 (“[I]t is clear that Congress did not intend to 
extend RICO liability under § 1962(c) beyond those who participate in the 
operation or management of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering 
activity.”). 
 233. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 
2006) (ruling on violations of RICO stemming from a pattern of Immigration and 
Nationality Act violations). 
 234.  United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (considering a 
violation of RICO resulting from a drug and stolen property importation and 
distribution crime network). 
 235. See supra Part IV.A; 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2018) (prohibiting investment 
of proceeds from racketeering patterns in an enterprise). 
 236. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 185 (“Infiltration of legitimate organizations by 
‘outsiders’ is clearly addressed in subsections (a) and (b), and the ‘operation or 
management’ test that applies under subsection (c) in no way limits the 
application of subsections (a) and (b) to ‘outsiders.’”). 
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should not be prosecuted.237 Instead of leaving the decision to 
individual prosecutors, the Organized Crime and Gang Section 
within the Criminal Division of the DOJ oversees and approves the 
commencement of prosecutions under RICO.238 A government 
attorney should only seek approval of a RICO prosecution if the 
case satisfies one or more of the requirements contained in the 
DOJ’s Justice Manual.239 Moreover, the Justice Manual provides 
that “the Criminal Division will not approve ‘imaginative’ 
prosecutions under RICO which are far afield from the 
congressional purpose of the RICO statute.”240 Two of the seven 
requirements for approval are particularly applicable to 
cryptocurrency criminals. 
Due in part to the widespread availability of the internet, 
cryptocurrency crimes often transcend state and international 
borders.241 This international usage makes it difficult to charge 
“related offenses which would otherwise have to be prosecuted 
separately in different jurisdictions.”242 For example, in the 
investigation of Cazes, the DOJ had to contend with an individual 
with two foreign citizenships, residing in Thailand, selling drugs 
throughout the United States.243 In Ulbricht’s case, the 
prosecution accused Ulbricht of facilitating drug sales to over one 
hundred thousand purchasers worldwide.244  
                                                                                                                 
 237. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-110.200 (2016) (“Despite 
the broad statutory language of RICO and the legislative intent that the 
statute ‘. . . shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose,’ it is 
the policy of the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively and uniformly used.”). 
 238.  See id. at §§ 9-110.101, 9-110.210 (“No RICO criminal indictment or 
information or civil complaint shall be filed, and no civil investigative demand 
shall be issued, without the prior approval of the Criminal Division.”). 
 239.  See id. at § 9-110.310 (requiring potential RICO cases to satisfy one of 
seven prerequisites for RICO prosecution).  
 240.  Id. at § 9-110.200. 
 241. See Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies; Bitcoin & What Now After 
Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 4, 2014, at 1, 
38 (“Virtual currencies present particularly difficult law enforcement challenges 
because of their ability to transcend national borders in the fraction of a second, 
unique jurisdictional issues and anonymity due to encryption.”). 
 242. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-110.310 (2020). 
 243.  See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 1:17-cr-00144 
(E.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) (charging predicate crimes originating in both New York 
and California against a Canadian citizen by birth with citizenship in Antigua 
and Barbuda residing in Bangkok, Thailand). 
 244. See Indictment, United States v. Ulbricht, Case No. 1:14-cr-00068 
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RICO is sometimes “necessary to ensure that the indictment 
adequately reflects the nature and extent of the criminal conduct” 
in cryptocurrency crimes.245 RICO was designed to protect 
innocent individuals.246 The cryptocurrency marketplace is 
sensitive to criminal activities. Government seizures and criminal 
prosecutions may result in violent swings in the value of a 
cryptocurrency, through no fault of the innocent user.247 For 
example, after the closure of Silk Road, bitcoins lost approximately 
a quarter of their value.248 Cryptocurrency networks support a 
wide range of economic activities, including holding 
cryptocurrencies as an investment.249 Yet continued criminal use 
of cryptocurrencies limits how much industrial investors are 
willing to participate in the market.250 The “nature and extent” of 
Silk Road’s effect on innocent Bitcoin users was not adequately 
reflected by the prosecution of just the underlying predicate acts 
because innocent Bitcoin users suffered personal losses as a result 
of Ulbricht’s actions, which affected the viability of the Bitcoin 
enterprise.251 
A final potential bar in the DOJ guidelines is that the 
Criminal Division will not approve “imaginative” prosecutions not 
                                                                                                                 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2014) (“The website was used by several thousand drug dealers 
and other unlawful vendors to distribute hundreds of kilograms of illegal drugs 
and other illegal goods and services to well over a hundred thousand buyers 
worldwide . . . .”). 
 245.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-110.310 (2020).  
 246. See 115 CONG. REC. 6993 (1969) (“In addition to this criminal prohibition, 
the bill also creates civil remedies for the honest businessman who has been 
damaged by unfair competition from the racketeer businessman.”). 
 247. See Alex Hern, Bitcoin Price Plummets After Silk Road Closure, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2013), https://perma.cc/Z94A-PAZF (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) 
(discussing Bitcoin’s price drop following the arrest of Ross Ulbricht and the 
closure of Silk Road) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 248.  See id. (documenting Bitcoin’s price drop from $145.70 down to $109.76). 
 249. See generally CHRIS BURNISKE & JACK TATAR, CRYPTOASSETS: THE 
INNOVATIVE INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO BITCOIN AND BEYOND (2017) (summarizing 
investment strategies for cryptocurrency).  
 250. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 20, at 1, 6 (stating that 
Bitcoin’s illicit usage raises concerns among stakeholders and that the industry 
will have to undergo several “credentialing moments” on the path to legitimacy).  
 251. See id. at 13 (discussing regulatory steps that governments are taking in 
light of the illegal use of cryptocurrency). 
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in line with Congress’s original focus on organized crime.252 This 
Note does not suggest that every single crypto-crime should be 
prosecuted under RICO, but rather only those crimes that reflect 
the same fears of Congress that motivated the statute.253 The law’s 
passage was predicated on findings that organized crime money 
was being used to “infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business” and 
that organized crime activities “harm innocent investors.”254 A 
Senate report stated that the law’s purpose was the “elimination 
of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into 
legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.”255 
Cryptocurrencies networks are an inventive organization of people 
working together to do business through a new innovation worthy 
of protection.256 
3. General Criticism of Novel RICO Cases 
Peter J. Henning, a professor at Wayne State University and 
New York Times author, wrote that judges often take “a dim view 
of efforts to turn what look like ordinary state law claims into 
federal cases by claiming a RICO violation.”257 Criticisms of the 
expansive use of RICO have continued since it exploded in usage 
in the 1970s.258 G. Robert Blakey—an author of the statute, 
vociferous defender of RICO, and former Notre Dame Law 
professor—responded to some these criticism in a law review 
article.259 In response to criticisms that RICO was subject to 
                                                                                                                 
 252. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-110.200 (2016). 
 253. See supra Part II.A (regarding the original motivation for passing RICO). 
 254. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 
(1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2018)). 
 255. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76 (1969). 
 256. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 114, at 8 (“We have proposed a system for 
electronic transactions without relying on trust.”). 
 257. Henning, supra note 14; see also G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, 
An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various 
Proposals for Reform: “Mother of God—Is This the End of RICO?”, 43 VAND. L. 
REV. 851, 987 (1990) (“When the private bar began to bring RICO suits, the 
district courts reacted with hostility and undertook judicially to redraft the 
statute in an effort to dismiss civil suits in all possible ways.”). 
 258. See Blakey, supra note 257, at 857–59 (analyzing myths regarding the 
overuse of RICO and supporting its continued viability). 
 259. See id. at 859 (“If these efforts [to rewrite RICO] succeed, victims of 
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abusive lawsuits, Blakey analyzed a list of cases labeled “abusive” 
by the Business/Labor Coalition for Civil RICO Reform.260 He 
noted that even in these abusive civil cases, the system weeded out 
the egregious examples quickly and courts dismissed the cases.261 
RICO was enacted to provide a “gap filler” to allow prosecution of 
organized crime.262 Cryptocurrency crimes likely fall into the broad 
net purposefully cast by Congress in enacting RICO and should not 
be considered an abusive use of the statute.263 In fact, Professor 
Lynch argued that imaginative prosecutions have the tacit 
endorsement of Congress in light of legislative inaction after broad 
interpretations of the statute by the Supreme Court.264 
V. Conclusion 
RICO is an incredibly broad statute.265 Conversations 
regarding the law are typically not concerned with what it can do, 
but what it should do.266 Judges look favorably upon criminal 
                                                                                                                 
sophisticated forms of crime everywhere will be harmed.”).  
 260. See id. at 877 (“The charge that the right to file civil RICO suits is being 
abused was, until recently, just that: a charge.”). 
 261. See id. (noting that this is the system working correctly to eliminate 
frivolous cases). 
 262. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. 
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 263. See supra Part IV (outlining how cryptocurrency networks might satisfy 
the association-in-fact enterprise). 
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 265. See BROWN & PORTER, supra note 7, at § 1:1 (“RICO was intentionally 
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 266. Compare Nora Freeman Engstrom, Retaliatory RICO and the Puzzle of 
Fraudulent Claiming, 115 MICH. L. REV. 639, 699 (2017) (arguing that RICO 
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Lynn Rosenbaum, The RICO Trend in Class Action Warfare, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
165, 220 (2016) (“Even if frivolous litigation is a genuine problem in aggregate 
litigation, this Article demonstrates why the RICO reprisal must be rejected as a 
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RICO prosecutions while turning up their noses to civil cases using 
the same operative sections.267 Perhaps the true question of 
whether to employ RICO should be based on whether a particular 
case reflects Congress’s original concern with organized crime.268 
Cryptocurrency is a young industry which has become a target for 
criminals.269 Cryptocurrency networks are groups of users working 
together to provide legitimate alternatives to traditional financial 
institutions.270 When criminals use cryptocurrency, they are 
interfering with the legitimate business of the cryptocurrency 
network and its users.271 Although this Note proposes a novel 
RICO application, the argument is predicated on addressing the 
situation where criminals have infiltrated a legitimate 
cryptocurrency business and their activities substantially affect its 
operations, in accordance with the purpose of the statute described 
in Turkette.272 Keeping that purpose in mind, small instances of 
cryptocurrency crime should not be prosecuted under the statute. 
However, RICO can be put to good use to protect the 
cryptocurrency industry when someone engages in an organized 
and systematic criminal effort to abuse and infiltrate a 
cryptocurrency network. 
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